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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***AC
Date: 6/23/2021 2:35 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS COURT DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
GRADY REDEVELOPMENT, LLC; CAPITOL
GATEWAY, LLC; HARRIS
REDEVELOPMENT, LLC; and CARVER
REDEVELOPMENT,LLC,
Plaintiffs,

Vv.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2017CV294880

THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY
OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ AND AH’S CROSS-MOTIONS
This case comes to the Court on cross-motions. Plaintiffs Grady Redevelopment, LLC,
Capitol Gateway, LLC, Harris Redevelopment, LLC, and Carver Redevelopment, LLC

(“Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Sanctions, Attorney’s Fees,
and Additional Costs of Litigation (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”). Defendant The Housing Authority of
the City of Atlanta, Georgia (“Defendant” or ““AH”) submitted a Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment (“AH’s Motion”).

Having considered the record, the briefing, oral argument, and

applicable law, the Court DENIES both Plaintiffs’ Motion and AH’s Motion for the reasonsthat
follow.
1.

BACKGROUND
This case involves the interpretation of various agreements granting Plaintiffs options to

purchase parcels of real property (referred to as “Further Leverage Property” or “FLP”) in and

Page 1 of 9

around four separate revitalization projects developed by Plaintiffs.'! A description of the parties
and the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements is contained in the Court’s Order on
Defendants’ [First] Motion for Summary Judgment entered on October 16, 2019. In that Order,
the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. In
particular, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim arising out of the Revitalization
Amendments and Option Agreements survived summary judgment.
After the October 16, 2019 Order, the parties engaged in significant negotiations.

On

December 18, 2019, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement and Release (the “12/18/19
Settlement Agreement”) that was intended to resolveall claims in this action and was contingent
upon approval by the AH Board of Commissioners.” The Board approved the 12/18/19 Settlement
Agreement with additional terms in a public meeting held on February 26, 2020.3 Thereafter, the
parties also executed a First Amendment to Settlement Agreement and Release that was executed
on March 11, 2020 (the “3/11/20 Amendment”).4
AH contendsthat the 3/11/20 Amendmentis unenforceable because it was not signed by
the Chairman of the AH Board and becauseits terms were not approved by the Board. Plaintiffs

dispute both of these allegations. AH also contendsthat evenif the 3/11/20 Amendmenthad been
properly executed and approved, a July 2, 2020 letter from Jane B. Hornstein of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) confirms that HUD will never approve
the conveyances of the FLP on the terms agreed to by the parties in the Revitalization

' The relevant agreements will be referred to in this Orderas the Revitalization Amendments and
Option Agreements. They are attached to the Amended Complaint, Exhibits 6-9 and 10-13,
respectively. The agreements were executed contemporaneously.
* The 12/18/19 Settlement Agreement is Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Motion.
3 An unofficial transcript of the public meeting is in the record. See Pls’ Mot., Ex. 3.
4 The 3/11/20 Amendmentis Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs’ Motion.
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Amendments, Option Agreements, the 12/18/19 Settlement Agreement, and the 3/11/20
Amendment, thus invalidating all of those agreements.
In Plaintiffs’ Motion, they seek to enforce the 12/18/19 Settlement Agreement as amended
by the 3/11/20 Amendment (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Integrated Settlement
Agreement”). AH opposesthat motion and has moved for summary judgmentcontendingthat the
Integrated Settlement Agreement is unenforceable, and that the Revitalization Amendments and
the Option Agreements are likewise unenforceable. Additionally, AH contendsin its Motion that
it has satisfied all conditions imposed by the Integrated Settlement Agreement and therefore
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim mustfail.
Il.

ANALYSIS
The Parties agree that the standard of review applied to motions to enforce settlement

agreements and to summary judgment motions are substantively the same. Andersonv. Benton,
295 Ga. App. 851, 852 (2009). Summary judgmentis appropriate where there is no genuine issue
of material fact, and movantis entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56. The
standard of review on a motionto enforce a settlement agreementis similar: “a party must show
the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that

there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the [nonmoving party’s] case.” Kolbus v. Fromm, 327 Ga. App. 431, 432 (2014)(citation omitted). As
with summary judgment,all facts are viewed in favor of the non-movingparty. Id.
In Georgia, settlements are deemed contracts. H&E Innovation, LLC v. Shinhan Bank
Am., Inc., 343 Ga. App. 881, 881 (2017). The rules of contract construction require courts to
examine the four corners of a contract and not considerparol evidence if the documents are clear
on their face. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(1). Courts may not award specific performance on termsthat
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parties did not agree to: “It is the duty of the courts to construe and enforce contracts as made, and
not to make them for the parties. The law will not make a contract for the parties which is different
from the contract which was executed by them.” Lee v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Ga., 343 Ga. App.

729, 735 (2017).
A,

Plaintiffs’ Motion is Denied Because AH HasSatisfied All Conditions Imposed
by the Integrated Settlement Agreement.

Asan initial matter, Sections 3.2, 3.4, and 10 of the Integrated Settlement Agreement make

HUD?’s approval of the conveyance a necessary condition precedent to AH’s ability to complete
the transactions. They also make clear that if such HUD approval of the conveyances is not
provided, AH is not in default of the Integrated Settlement Agreement. Finally, they limit AH’s
contractual obligations to acting in a manner expressly required by the Integrated Settlement
Agreement.
It is undisputed that AH sent HUDthe First Disposition Submission as required by the
Integrated Settlement Agreement. HUD respondedto the First Disposition Submissionin letter
dated July 2, 2020. The July 2, 2020 letter acknowledged that the Settlement Agreement turned
on HUDapproval, but the federal agency rejected the submission.»
HUDwrote that it would “not approve a formal disposition application from [AH] that
proposed a bifurcated (interim and final) dispositionstructure.” (Ex. 8 to Pls.’ Mot. at 2.) Nor
would HUD approve a disposition from AH “to one or more holding companies unless the

> Specifically, HUD’s letter cited the Integrated Settlement Agreementprovision stating that “the
failure of HUD to grant approval of one or more of the disposition requests, or if HUD shall
condition approval or conveyance on termsdifferent than or inconsistent with the term of
the Settlement Agreement, [Integral] acknowledge[s] that HUD’s decisionsor actions shall not
constitute a default” by AH. (Ex. 8 to Pls.’ Mot. at 2 (emphasisin original).)
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applications metall requirements of Section 18” of the Fair Housing Act. (Id.) The parties agree
that they approvedofthe bifurcated approval process.°
Plaintiffs argue that Sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Integrated Settlement Agreement require
that AH correct any deficienciesin the disposition application identified by HUD untilit is legallycompliant. However, the Parties specifically agreed to a bifurcated approval process and only
agreed to a bifurcated approval process. The Integrated Settlement Agreement provides that AH
is not in default if “HUD shall condition approval or conveyance on terms different than or
inconsistent with terms of the” Integrated Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs point to no language
in the Integrated Settlement Agreement that requires AH to do anything different than the
application and approval processoutlined in the Integrated Settlement Agreement.
Plaintiffs’ conduct further supports the conclusion that AH fulfilled its part of the bargain.
Specifically, Plaintiffs (1) knew what information AH submitted to HUD and when such
information was submitted; (2) never objected to the form of the submission; (3) wrote HUD in
support of the submission as presented by AH; and (4) twice tried to convince HUD that the
proposed disposition process was permissible. Thus, while Plaintiffs now argue that AH’s position
elevates process over substance (Pls.’ Reply Br. at 27-28), Plaintiffs’ own communications
establish that the information AH provided to HUD was appropriate and consistent with the
parties’ “long-standing and expressly stated intent.”

(See August 12, 2020 letter written by

° As an additional position, HUD concludedthat the First Disposition Submission “would not meet
the statutory and/or regulatory requirements of Section 18 or 24 CFR 970.” (Ex. 8 to Pls.’ Mot. at
3.) One of the reasons is that the transaction, as contemplated in the Integrated Settlement
Agreement, could not demonstrate fair market value. (Ex.8 to Pls.’ Mot. at 3.) And while property
dispositions below fair market value are not per se improper, HUD regulations require evidence
of a commensurate public benefit to the community whentheprice is less than fair market value.
(Id.) HUD determined that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a commensurate public benefit to the
community that would justify allowing AH to convey the FLP to Plaintiffs at a price below fair
market value. (Id.)
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Plaintiffs’ housing counsel, Orlando Cabrera of Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP. (Ex. 9 to Pls.’
Mot.)) The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments do not overcomethe dispositive effect of HUD’s rejection
of Plaintiffs’ proposed disposition structure. Specifically, at the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that AH
breached Section 13(m) of the Integrated Settlement Agreement. That provision requires the
parties to “cooperate in good faith with one another to meet the deadlines contained herein and to
prepare all documents and obtain all approvals as may be necessary in orderto affect the Parties’
intent with respect to this Settlement Agreement.” (Integrated Settlement Agreement J 13(m).)
Under Georgia law,parties’ intent is determined bythe text of the contractitself. Langley v. MP
Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321, 324 (2019). In this case, there is nothing to be resolved by jury.
Indeed, in Mr. Cabrera’s letter to HUD, Plaintiffs admit that AH submitted all documents to HUD
that it was required to provide underthe Integrated Settlement Agreement: “Everything that [AH]
proposed to HUDis based on long-standing and expressly stated intent.” (Cabrera Letter at 3.)
The Court finds that AH fulfilled its contractual obligations and did not breach the
Integrated Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the Court DENIESPlaintiffs’ Motion and need
not address Plaintiffs’ remaining contentions.
B.

AH’s Motion is Denied Because HUD’s Rejection of the Conditions Imposed
by the Integrated Settlement Agreement Does
Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements.

Not

Invalidate

the

AHarguesthat the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreementsare “deadletters,”
see AH’s MSJ Br. at 3, for several reasons, none of which have merit. First, AH contends that
HUD’s refusal to allow seller-financed conveyances for less than fair market value to 50/50
holding companies renders the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements unenforceable
because they too are structured in this manner. AH’s argument about what HUD will not approve
in the future is persuasive, but not dispositive. There is nothing in the record that conclusively
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establishes that in the future HUD will disapprove of a conveyancestructured as referenced in the
Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements. Absent such evidence, the Court is not
willing to speculate about what HUD will and will not approvein the future.
Second, AH argues that the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements fail
because they too require the bifurcated disposition process that HUD hasrejected. As aninitial
matter, the record is not clear that the language of the Revitalization Amendments and Option
Agreements require the same bifurcated disposition process that HUD previously rejected. The
only mention of HUD in the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements is an
acknowledgment that the transfer of the FLP to an [Owner Entity] “may be subject to HUDimposeddeedrestrictions ... and Declarations of Trust,” and the requirementin the Revitalization
Amendments and Option Agreements that, “[AH] shall use its best, reasonable efforts acting in
good faith to obtain any required HUD approvals andreleases of the Pending HUD Restrictions.”
(See Revitalization Amendments, § 2(c)(i)(B) (pertaining to On-site Land) & Option Agreements,
§ 7.) The corollary applicable to Off-site land is materially identical. (Id., § 2(c)(ii)(C).) Again,
AH’s argument about what HUD will not approvein the future is persuasive, but not dispositive.
The Court cannot speculate as to whether in the future HUD will approvea disposition application
pursuant to the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements.
Third, AH contends that the merger clause in the Integrated Settlement Agreement
supersedes and invalidates the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements, so that
performance thereunder is no longer required. The merger clause readsin relevantpart:
c. Entire Agreement. This Settlement Agreement contains the entire agreement
between the Parties regarding the settlement and compromiseof the claims in
the Lawsuit and supersedes any and all other prior and contemporaneous
agreements and understandings between the Parties, whether oral or written
regarding the settlement of the Lawsuit.
Integrated Settlement Agreement, § 13(c).
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AH’s argument assumesthat the Settlement Agreement can and must be fully performed.
In fact, the Integrated Settlement Agreement cannot be fully performed because of
impracticability.

“Impracticability of performance is a legal justification or excuse for

nonperformanceof a contractual obligation.” Martinez v. Rocky Mt. Bank, 540 F. App’x 846,
852 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Central Kan. Credit Union v. Mutual Guar. Corp., 102 F.3d 1097,
1102 (10th Cir. 1996)). The dispositive principle is found in § 261 of the Restatement of Contracts,
which provides:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981). Furthermore, the Restatement also considers the
effect of governmental regulations. As § 264 of the Restatement provides:
If the performance of a duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a
domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, that regulation or order is an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 264 (1981).

In the case at bar, the disposition of the

properties to Plaintiffs was fundamental to their agreement to dismiss this lawsuit and release AH
from any further obligations under the Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements.
HUD?’s refusal to approvethe disposition as outlined in the Integrated Settlement Agreement made
Plaintiffs’ performance impracticable.

Plaintiffs are therefore discharged of their obligations

under the Integrated Settlement Agreements,includingtheir obligations to (1) dismiss the lawsuit
(Integrated Settlement Agreement, § 1.a.), (2) release their claims against defendants in this lawsuit
(Integrated Settlement Agreement, § 1.d.), and (3) discharge AH from their obligations under the
prior Revitalization Amendments and Option Agreements. See Yi v. Li, 313 Ga. App. 273, 277
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(2011) (“Even though the failure to meet such a contingency is not a condition precedent to the
existence of a valid contract, it is reasonable to holdthat the obtaining of[third party’s consent]
was a condition precedent to the duty of both parties to render their promised performances.”
(Emphasis in original, citation and punctuation omitted)).
I.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Sanctions,

Attorney’s Fees and Additional Costs of Litigation is hereby DENIED, and AH’s Renewed
Motion for Summary judgment is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of June, 2021.

Judge Eric A. Richardson
Superior Court of Fulton County by Designation
Business Case Division
Served electronically
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